

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 10 MBFR VIENNA 0254

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS ON JUNE 3, 1975

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0253

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION

WITH EASTERN REPS ON JUNE 3, 1975. PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH

4 CONTAINING SUMMARY, TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

5. FRG REP AS HOST GREETED THE PARTICIPANTS. DRAWING
ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP, FRG REP SAID
THAT WESTERN REPS HAD REVIEWED WHAT HAD BEEN
SAID AT THE LAST SESSION REGARDING THE QUESTION OF THE NEED
FOR BOTH SIDES TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF
POTENTIAL AGREEMENTS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH AGREEMENTS

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WERE ACCEPTABLE OR NOT. ALLIED REPS BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS IN

FACT A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AMONG PARTICIPANTS REGARDING THIS QUESTION. AT THE LAST SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD DRAWN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN NEGOTIATIONS ON OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED UNDER AN AGREEMENT AND DISCUSSION OF THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR EACH SIDE OF SUCH OBLIGATIONS. WESTERN REPS AGREED WITH THE EAST THAT THE PRIMARY TASK OF NEGOTIATORS WAS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY EACH SIDE.

6. FRG REP SAID THE WEST ALSO AGREED WITH THE POINT MADE BY AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV AND BY AMBASSADOR STRULAK THAT, IN DECIDING WHAT OBLIGATIONS TO UNDERTAKE, EACH SIDE MUST ASSESS FOR ITSELF THE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED OBLIGATIONS AND DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH ITS SECURITY. OF COURSE, SOME OF THESE EFFECTS WERE SO IMPORTANT THAT THEY HAD A DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE BEARING ON ANY DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL OBLIGATIONS. THIS INCLUDED THE EFFECTS OF THE LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT. IN GENERAL TERMS, NO PARTICIPANT COULD ACCEPT OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON ITS SECURITY. THIS POINT ALSO WAS NOT IN DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

7. FRG REP ASSERTED THAT THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE IN INITIATING THIS DISCUSSION OF THE EFFECTS OF POTENTIAL OBLIGATIONS WAS TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE EAST THE WESTERN ASSESSMENT OF SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT OF THESE EFFECTS WHICH DID HAVE A DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE BEARING ON ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER undertAKING CERTAIN MAJOR OBLIGATIONS. IT WAS EVIDENT TO ALL PARTICIPANTS THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS, IT MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. AT A MINIMUM, EACH SIDE MUST BE SATISFIED THAT THE EFFECTS OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED UNDER THE AGREEMENT DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT ITS SECURITY. IN A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION SUCH AS THIS ONE, EACH SIDE -- REALISTICALLY SPEAKING -- HAD TO BE AWARE OF HOW THE OTHER SIDE ASSESSED THE RELATIVE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF PROPOSED OBLIGATIONS. WESTERN REPS FELT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO SUGGEST THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD MAKE SUCH AN ASSESSMENT ON ITS OWN AND NOT DISCUSS IT WITH THE OTHER SIDE.

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8. FRG REP MAINTAINED THAT IN THIS NEGOTIATION BOTH SIDES HAD STARTED FROM QUITE DIFFERENT POSITIONS. THEREFORE, AS EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT, IN ORDER TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE POSITION, EACH SIDE NEEDED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THE OTHER SIDE VIEWED ITS OWN INTERESTS. NECESSARILY, THIS MUST INCLUDE HOW IT ASSESSED THE EFFECTS FOR ITS OWN SECURITY OF PROPOSED OBLIGATIONS. WESTERN REPS HAD BEEN TRYING TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE EAST HOW THE ALLIES VIEWED THEIR OWN

INTERESTS AND HOW THEY ASSESSED THE EFFECTS ON WESTERN SECURITY OF THE OBLIGATIONS THE EAST WAS PROPOSING AND THOSE WHICH WOULD BE COMMON TO ANY AGREEMENT. UNLESS ALLIED REPS DID THIS, THE EAST WOULD NOT KNOW THE REASONS FOR THE WESTERN POSITION, AND THUS WHAT CONSIDERATIONS THE EAST SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHEN CONSIDERING ITS OWN POSITIONS.

9. FRG REP CONCLUDED THAT THE WEST CONSIDERED THIS KIND OF DISCUSSION HELPFUL IN DEVELOPING THE BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WHICH IN TURN COULD HELP PARTICIPANTS TO FIND A COMMON, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. THAT WAS WHY WESTERN REPS HAD TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE EAST THAT THE ALLIES COULD NOT AGREE TO CONTRACTUALIZE THE PRESENT WESTERN INFERIORITY IN GROUND FORCES AND COULD NOT FOCUS IN THESE DISCUSSIONS SOLELY ON THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS, BUT MUST ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PRESENT DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES AND THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF ENDURING FORCE LIMITATIONS RESULTING FROM PROPOSED AGREEMENTS.

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FROM US REP MBFR

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10. POLISH REP STRULAK SAID FRG REP HAD REFERRED TO THE DISCUSSION IN THE LAST INFORMAL MEETING. HE TOO WOULD ALSO LIKE TO COMMENT ON THAT DISCUSSION. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AT THE LAST SESSION HAD HELPED TO CLARIFY MORE PRECISELY A NUMBER OF ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD NOTED FROM WESTERN STATEMENTS DURING THE LAST INFORMAL MEETING THAT WESTERN REPS SEEMED TO BE GIVING SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO THE ISSUE OF OVERALL CONSEQUENCES AS A NECESSARY ASPECT OF EVALUATING A REDUCTION AGREEMENT ITSELF. IN THIS CONNECTION, WESTERN REPS HAD REPEATED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS THEY HAD POSED AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND OF NEGOTIATION AND HAD ASKED FOR EASTERN REPLIES. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THEY HAD GIVEN EXHAUSTIVE ANSWERS TO THESE
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QUESTIONS AT THE LAST SESSION. EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO RAISED A GENERAL POINT OF METHODOLOGY DURING THE DISCUSSION IN THE LAST SESSION CONCERNING THE AIM AND PROPER SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IDENTIFYING ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD ONLY COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. AS FRG REP HAD SAID, EASTERN REPS DREW A LINE BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS TO BE INCLUDED IN AN AGREEMENT WHICH PARTICIPANTS WOULD EVENTUALLY SIGN AND ON THE OTHER HAND, EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN AGREEMENT. THE LATTER ACTIVITY WOULD TAKE PARTICIPANTS OUTSIDE THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER AND MIGHT GREATLY COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS BECAUSE ANY EVALUATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN AGREEMENT WAS A SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION, DIFFERING FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. TO TRY TO MAKE THIS EVALUATION INTO ONE AGREED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE AN ENORMOUS TASK WHICH WOULD NOT HELP THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT, TO THE CONTRARY, MAKE THEM LESS PRODUCTIVE.

11. POLISH REP SAID EASTERN REPS FOUND CONFIRMATION OF THIS VIEW IN WESTERN VIEWS THUS FAR PRESENTED ON THE OVERALL CONSEQUENCES OF REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPS SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE OVERALL CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS. BUT IN ACTUALITY, WESTERN REPS WERE SINGLING OUT ONLY SOME OF THE CONSEQUENCES, THOSE WHICH OPERATED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE WESTERN CASE AND LINE OF ARGUMENT, WHICH WESTERN REPS HAD MAINTAINED UNCHANGED FROM THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

12. POLISH REP SAID IT WAS NOT DIFFICULT TO FIND EXAMPLES OF THIS WESTERN TENDENCY. FOR EXAMPLE, WESTERN REPS STRESSED

THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR OR RATHER, ONE ASPECT OF IT: THE LOCATION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR VIS-A-VIS THE REDUCTION AREA. WESTERN REPS RATHER CONVENIENTLY FORGOT ABOUT OTHER FACTORS RELEVANT TO GEOGRAPHY. WHEN THESE FACTORS WERE NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AN UNREAL PICTURE OF THE CONSEQUENCES EMERGED. EASTERN REPS DID NOT INTEND TO GET INVOLVED IN THE DISCUSSION OF CONSEQUENCES. BUT THEY HAD NONETHELESS POINTED OUT THAT SOME CONSEQUENCES COULD BE CLEARLY SEEN AND THEN EVALUATED UNEQUIVOCABLY. ONE EXAMPLE WAS THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH, WHICH ENVISAGED REDUCTION OF ONLY GROUND FORCES, LEFT THE WAY OPEN TO AN SECRET

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ARMS RACE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN GENERAL, EVEN THOSE IN GROUND FORCES. THIS ILLUSTRATIVE APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH CONFIRMED THE CORRECTNESS OF THE BASIC EASTERN APPROACH AND OF THE EASTERN METHOD OF WORK: TO DEAL WITH THE CONCRETE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS ON THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, RATHER THAN TO INDULGE IN A FAR-REACHING DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES.

13. POLISH REP SAID THIS EASTERN APPROACH ALSO ANSWERED THE POINTS WESTERN REPS HAD RECENTLY RAISED ABOUT THE NEED TO DISCUSS FIGURES. IN THE LAST SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD GIVEN THE WEST REASONS FOR THE POSITION THE EAST TOOK ON THIS ISSUE. AS FAR AS THE EASTERN POSITION ON BASIC ISSUES WAS CONCERNED, THE EAST HAD AGREED AND THE WEST HAD ALSO FAVERED THIS, TO DISCUSS SEVERAL SUCH ASPECTS. A PRELIMINARY LIST HAD BEEN DRAWN UP. THIS FIRST ISSUE ON THIS WAS THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT A SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION COULD MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

14. POLISH REP SAID EASTERN REPS INTENDED IN THE PRESENT SESSION TO CALL THE ATTENTION OF THEIR WESTERN COLLEAGUES TO SOME OF THE BASIC PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS QUESTION BECAUSE LACK OF AN AGREED SOLUTION TO IT WAS AN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS. WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, THE VIEWS OF EACH SIDE WERE WELL KNON. THE EASTERN VIEW WAS THAT THE MILITARY FORCES AND EQUIPMENT OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THIS WAS A REALISTIC APPROACH, SCIENTIFICALLY FOUNDED, AND FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY AND EQUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS, UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, AND NO UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE. IN ADDITION TO THIS BASIC EASTERN POSITION, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE TO MOVE

FORWARD WITH A DIFFERENT POSITION GUIDED BY A DESIRE TO
FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. ACCORDINGLY, EASTERN
REPS HAD PROPOSED SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS
TO THE NOVEMBER 8, 1973 DRAFT AGREEMENT. IN ACCORDANCE
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WITH THESE PROPOSALS, REDUCTIONS IN 1975 AND 1976 WOULD BE
CARRIED OUT BY THE US AND BY THE USSR. THEN ONLY, AFTER
THESE REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN COMPLETED, THE REMAINING DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS WOULD PROCEED TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. EASTERN
REPS CONSIDERED THIS A LARGE STEP TOWARDS THE WESTERN
POSITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US SHOULD REDUCE
THEIR FORCES FIRST. HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN NO WESTERN
RESPONSE TO THESE SEVERAL MOVES FROM THE EAST. WESTERN REPS
HAD MAINTAINED THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION WHICH CONTRADICTED
THE AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES. MOREOVER, THIS
WESTERN POSITION REFLECTED A TENDENCY TO SEEK UNILATERAL
MILITARY ADVANTAGE. SINCE EASTERN REPS FOUND THAT WESTERN
VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE RAN COUNTER TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS
OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH AN

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ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT BASED ON THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE APPROACH.

15. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT SINCE PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME, WESTERN REPS MUST BE AWARE OF HOW THINGS STOOD. NONETHELESS, THE WEST STILL HAD NOT MADE ANY MOVE ON ITS PART TO SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPABLE SOLUTION. THERE HAD BEEN NO WESTERN MOVES ON THIS ISSUE AND NO MOVES CORRESPONDING TO THOSE MADE BY THE EAST. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS UP TO THE WEST TO MAKE THE NEXT MOVE IF THERE WAS TO BE PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

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16. POLISH REP SAID THE SITUATION WAS PARTICULARLY COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE 6 NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD CONSISTENTLY DECLINED TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT ABOUT THEIR READINESS TO UNDERTAKE CLEAR AND SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS ON REDUCTIONS. STARTING WITH THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT, EACH OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD SPECIFICALLY DECLARED THE SIZE AND TIMING OF PROJECTED REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES. EASTERN REPS DID NOT REGARD IT AS A NORMAL SITUATION THAT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WESTERN REPS HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GIVE AN ANSWER TO A SIMPLE SPECIFIC EASTERN QUESTION: WHAT SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WAS EACH WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT PREPARED TO ACCEPT? HE WISHED TO ASK WESTERN REPS WHETHER THEY DID NOT THINK IT UNREALISTIC TO PROCEED TO WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE POSITION OF EACH PARTY ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE AGREEMENT? THEREFORE, THE ATTITUDE OF THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS HIGH TIME TO REMOVE THIS OBSTACLE. EASTERN REPS HAD MADE THIS POINT CONCERNING THE NEED FOR CLARITY ON THE SIZE AND TIMING OF SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS. THEY HAD RECEIVED NO ANSWER. BUT THEY CONTINUED TO EXPECT

A REPLY TO THIS QUESTION FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF EACH NON-US DIRECT WESTERN PARTICIPANT. AS A MATTER OF COURTESY, BECAUSE FRG REP WAS HOST OF THE PRESENT SESSION, HE WOULD ADDRESS THIS QUESTION NOW TO THE FRG REP, AND THEN TO THE CANADIAN REP AND THROUGH THE ASSISTANCE OF THOSE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT, TO THE REMAINING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES. IF THE EAST COULD RECEIVE A POSITIVE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION, PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

17. FRG REP SAID POLISH REP HAD RAISED A NUMBER OF POINTS. AS REGARDS THE ISSUE OF METHODOLOGY, AS FAR AS FRG REP COULD SEE, PARTICIPANTS WERE STILL NOT TOO FAR APART. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT IT WAS THE PRIMARY TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON OBLIGATIONS. BUT HOW COULD PARTICIPANTS REACH THIS AGREEMENT UNLESS EASTERN REPS UNDERSTOOD HOW WEST ASSESSED THE EFFECTS OF THE

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OBLIGATIONS PROPOSED BY THE EAST ON WESTERN SECURITY? THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT WESTERN REPS INTENDED TO SEEK OR REACH FORMAL AGREEMENT ON ALL POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER DISCUSSION. THE POLISH REP HAD GIVEN HIS OWN RATHER LOP-SIDED ACCOUNT. HE HAD CLAIMED WESTERN REPS WERE CONSIDERING ONLY PART OF THE EFFECTS. FOR EXAMPLE, ONLY PART OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR-- ONLY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LOCATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS NOT TRUE. WESTERN REPS HAD CONSIDERED OTHER ASPECTS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION, THE FACT THAT THE TERRITORY OF THE MAJOR PARTNER OF THE WESTERN ALLIES WAS LOCATED 5000 KILOMETERS AWAY FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

18. FRG REP SAID THE SECOND POINT MADE BY POLISH REP WAS A REPETITION OF THE POINT EASTERN REPS HAD MADE ON THE LAST OCCASION, NAMELY, THAT THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH WOULD PERMIT OR EVEN ENCOURAGE AN ARMS RACE. FRG REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO THIS QUESTION. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, FRG REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE ARGUING THAT THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, BECAUSE IT FOCUSED ON

GROUND FORCES AND DID NOT PROVIDE FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS EXCEPT FOR SOVIET TANKS, WOULD LEAVE THE WAY OPEN FOR AN ARMS RACE IN THE AREA. THE ALLIES CONSIDERED THAT THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, IF ACCEPTED, WOULD EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN FUTURE ARMS RACES. A SITUATION OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, ONCE ACHIEVED, WOULD BE A STABLE SITUATION, CREATING CONFIDENCE. THERE WOULD BE NO REASON TO ENGAGE IN AN ARMS

RACE. THE WEST HAD PROPOSED OVERALL LIMITATIONS ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA. WESTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT SUCH LIMITATIONS WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT RESTRAINT ON POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING INCREASES IN FORCE CAPABILITIES IN THE AREA. UNDER THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, ALL UNIFORMED MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA--WITH THE AGREED EXCEPTION OF THE NAVY--WOULD BE COVERED.

19. FRG REP CONTINUED, THAT, MOREOVER, AT PRESENT, THE EAST WAS SUPERIOR TO THE WEST, NOT ONLY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER

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AND TANKS, BUT ALSO IN OTHER MAJOR ARMAMENTS SUCH AS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT. FRG REP SAID THIS NEW EMPHASIS BY THE EAST ON THE ALLEGED POSSIBILITY OF A ARMS RACE APPEARED TO MEAN THAT EASTERN REPS WERE, IN EFFECT, ASKING THE WEST TO CONTRACTUALIZE NOT ONLY THE PRESENT DISPARITY IN GROUND MANPOWER AND IN TANKS, BUT IN A NUMBER OF OTHER MAJOR ARMAMENTS AS WELL. WESTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY TOLD EASTERN REPS THAT THE WEST WAS UNWILLING TO CONTRACTUALIZE THE EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN RELINQUISHING THE WESTERN RIGHT TO MAKE GOOD THE DISPARITY AT SOME FUTURE TIME. THE EASTERN INSISTENCE ON CONTRACTUALIZING THIS DISPARITY WAS A MAJOR BARRIER TO AGREEMENT. IT WAS EVIDENCE THAT IF EASTERN REPS SERIOUSLY INTENDED TO CONTRACTUALIZE EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL, THIS WOULD MAKE THE TASK OF REACHING AGREEMENT ENORMOUSLY MORE DIFFICULT.

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20. FRG REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP ONE MORE POINT MADE BY POLISH REP. FRG REP COULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION FOR ALL THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS CONCERNED. AS EASTERN REPS WERE AWARE, THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THEY WERE WILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING. WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT PHASE I MUST CONTAIN AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING. WESTERN REPS HAD SUGGESTED AN ILLUSTRATIVE SIZE OF 700,000 MEN FOR EACH SIDE. THUS, WESTERN REPS HAD INDICATED THE TOTAL SIZE OF REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED FOR BOTH SIDES, REDUCTIONS IN WHICH ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD PARTICIPATE. THIS POSITION WAS WELL-KNOWN TO EASTERN REPS.

21. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THE FACT WAS THAT FRG REP HAD NOT GIVEN SECRET

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A PRECISE ANSWER TO THE EASTERN QUESTION. ASSUMING WESTERN REPS USED EVEN THEIR OWN FIGURES FOR THIS PURPOSE, WHAT WOULD BE THE SPECIFIC FRG REDUCTION IN PHASE II? THE ENTIRE VOLUME OF THE PROPOSED WESTERN REDUCTION WAS LESS THAN THE 15 PERCENT OF TOTAL FORCES THE EAST WAS SUGGESTING. FRG REP HAD MENTIONED THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT LARGER OBLIGATIONS. TO JUDGE ONCE AGAIN BY WESTERN FIGURES, THE ENTIRE VOLUME OF REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE II WOULD BE LESS THAN FOR THE EAST. BUT EASTRN REPS HAD SAID MANY TIMES THAT THEY HAD TO KNOW THESE FACTS. PARTICIPANTS WERE DISCUSSING MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES. USING WESTERN FIGURES, WHAT WOULD BE THE PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE II? WHAT WOULD BE FRG OBLIGATIONS? WHAT WOULD BE WRITTEN INTO THE AGREEMENT AS TO THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE FRG? IN THE

EASTERN VIEW THERE SHOULD BE A CLEAR OBLIGATION FOR EVERY DIRECT PARTICIPANT. THIS WAS KNOWN. BUT ACCORDING TO THE WESTERN APPROACH, WHAT KIND OF OBLIGATIONS FOR THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE WRITTEN INTO THEIR PHASE II AGREEMENT? EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN ASKING THIS QUESTION FOR THE SAKE OF CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE WESTERN POSITION. EASTERN REPS STILL DID NOT KNOW WHAT OBLIGATIONS NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO UNDER-TAKE.

22. FRG REP SAID WESTERN REPS HAD PROPOSED THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED IN PHASE I ON A COMMON CEILING. PARTICIPANTS COULD SPECIFY THE LEVEL OF THIS CEILING. THE WESTERN REPS HAD ALSO PROPOSED THAT PARTICIPANTS AGREE ON THE STARTING FIGURES. WESTERN REPS WERE READY TO DO THIS NOW. SO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STARTING FIGURES AND THE COMMON CEILING LEVEL AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS WERE DEDUCTED WOULD BE THE REDUCTION WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN IN PHASE II. THIS SEEMED TO ALLIED REPS TO BE A SPECIFIC INDICATION, MORE SPECIFIC THAN EASTERN FIGURES WHICH RELATED ONLY TO A PERCENTAGE OF AN UNSPECIFIED TOTAL.

23. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHETHER A WESTERN SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN PRECISE FIGURES ON REDUCTIONS OF FRG AND OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THE TIMING OF

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THESE REDUCTIONS. FRG REP SAID WESTERN REPS ENVISAGED GLOBAL CEILINGS FOR EACH SIDE. IN THE LAST SESSION, SOVIET REP HAD MENTIONED THAT EAST CONSIDERED THE FORCES OF EACH SIDE AS A SINGLE ENTITY. THIS JUSTIFIED GLOBAL CEILINGS. SMIRNOVSKY SAID EASTERN REPS HAD THE RIGHT TO KNOW WHAT WOULD BE WRITTEN INTO THE SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT AS TO WESTERN OBLIGATIONS. FRG REP SAID THESE OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE NEGOTIATED DURING THE SECOND PHASE. ALL THAT COULD BE SAID NOW WAS THAT WESTERN OBLIGATIONS. FRG REP SAID THESE OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE NEGOTIATED DURING THE SECOND PHASE. ALL THAT COULD BE SAID NOW WAS THAT WESTERN REPS ENVISAGED GLOBAL CEILINGS. THIS SHOULD ANSWER EASTERN QUESTIONS. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHETHER FRG REP MEANT TO SAY THAT IN A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT, THE FRG AND OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT INDICATE IN SPECIFIC TERMS A REDUCTION OBLIGATION. FRG REP SAID REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD DO NOTHING WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH A COLLECTIVE CEILING. SMIRNOVSKY SAID, IN OTHER WORDS, FRG REP WAS ANSWERING THAT IN A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT THE FRG WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS AND THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT KNOW EVEN AT THAT STAGE WHAT OBLIGATIONS THE FRG WAS WILLING TO UNDERTAKE. THIS WAS UNBELIEVABLE. KHLETOV SAID THAT, ACCORDING TO WESTERN

FIGURES, AFTER PHASE I US REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN, THERE WOULD BE 48,000 WESTERN REDUCTIONS LEFT. HOW MANY OF THESE WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE FRG IN PHASE II?

24. FRG REP SAID THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THE COLLECTIVE CEILING. ALL REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENT IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER IT WAS JUSTIFIABLE TO CONCLUDE FROM REMARKS OF FRG REP THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SPECIFIC PHASE II COMMITMENTS BY THE FRG, CANADA, OR OTHER REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, NO COMMITMENT AT ALL, NOT EVEN A PERCENTAGE OF THIS TOTAL OF 48,000 MEN? ACCORDING TO WESTERN FIGURES, NATO WOULD REDUCE 48,000. HOW MANY WOULD THE FRG TAKE? ACCORDING TO FRG REP'S RESPONSE, THIS WOULD NOT BE CLARIFIED IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE PRACTICALLY NOTHING.

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25. FRG REP SAID THAT, SINCE WESTERN REPS WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY NATIONAL CEILINGS, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THERE COULD NOT BE ANY NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO REDUCING A CERTAIN NUMBER OF FORCES. THERE COULD ONLY BE A COLLECTIVE COMMITMENT. AFTER IT WAS IMPLEMENTED, PARTICIPANTS COULD SEE THE RESULTS.

26. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS APPROACH WAS UNACCEPTABLE. IF THE EAST WAS TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS, THE EAST HAD TO KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE. FRG REP SAID THAT IN PHASE II, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO MOVE TOGETHER TO TAKE THE REMAINING REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING ON THEIR SIDE.

27. KHLESTOV SAID AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE AND THE ISSUE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE COMMON CEILING WERE TWO DIFFERENT

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ISSUES. IF THE FRG WAS NOT READY TO UNDERSTAKE AN OBLIGATION,
HOW COULD THERE BE AN AGREEMENT? FRG REP SAID WESTERN
PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT ACCEPT NATIONAL CEILINGS. THIS
WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE NATO SYSTEM OF INTEGRATED DEFENSE.
THE INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL COMMITMENTS EASTERN REPS PROPOSED
WOULD NECESSITATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL CEILINGS.
THIS WAS NOT A PRODUCTIVE WAY TO APPROACH THE ISSUE.

28. POLISH REP SAID FRG REP HAD MADE TWO POINTS WHOSE
LOGIC HE COULD NOT SEE. THE FIRST POINT WAS THIS CONTENTION
THAT NATIONAL CEILINGS WOULD EFFECT THE WORK OF NATO.
WESTERN REPS REQUIRED A NATIONAL CEILING ON SOVIET TROOPS
IN THE AREA. THIS WAS AN ILLOGICAL APPROACH. WEST WISHED
TO IMPOSE A CEILING ON FORCES WHICH CONSTITUTED THE LARGEST
SEGMENT OF EASTERN FORCES, WHILE THEIR COLLECTIVE CEILING
WAS INTENDED TO LEAVE FREEDOM FOR THE BULK OF NATO FORCES.

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THE OTHER EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE.
THEY KNEW THE NEEDS OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND OF WORKINGS
OF ALLIANCES. DESPITE THIS, THEY DID NOT FIND IT SO
DIFFICULT TO EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE A SPECIFIC
REDUCTION OBLIGATION. SINCE FRG REP HAD MENTIONED FIGURES,
AND THE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF PERTINENT FIGURES, ACCORDING TO
WESTERN FIGURES, THE WHOLE WESTERN QUOTA FOR THE SECOND

PHASE WOULD BE 48,000. AND NOT ALL OF THESE WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE US WOULD TAKE SOME PART OF IT. WESTERN REPS CONTINUALLY INSISTED ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, BUT WHEN EAST SUGGESTED 20,000 REDUCTIONS FOR EACH SIDE, WESTERN REPS SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL. WESTERN REPS CLAIMED 29,000 US REDUCTIONS WERE SUBSTANTIAL, BUT THAT 20,000 REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE EAST FOR ITS FIRST STEP WERE NOT.

29. FRG REP SAID THAT WEST WAS READY TO TAKE A TOTAL OF 77,000 REDUCTIONS. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS WAS NOT 15 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NATO FORCES EVEN USING WESTERN FIGURES. FRG REP ASKED SMIRNOVSKY HOW MANY REDUCTIONS EAST WAS WILLING TO TAKE IN ACTUAL NUMBERS. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED FRG REP WHY INDIVIDUAL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE BY A PERCENTAGE OF THE WESTERN TOTAL FIGURE?

30. US REP SAID WESTERN REPS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT, BEFORE THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ENTERED ON SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS, AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED ON THE COMMON CEILING OUTCOME AND ON A REDUCTION STEP WHICH WOULD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE THE INTENTION TO MOVE TO THAT OUTCOME.

31. SMIRNOVSKY SAID WESTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT, BEFORE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ASSUMED SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE EAST TO AGREE TO THE COMMON CEILING. BUT FROM WHAT FRG REP HAD JUST SAID, IT WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT, EVEN IF THE EAST AGREED TO THE COMMON CEILING, THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT AGREE TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS.

32. FRG REP SAID REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE BUT A COLLECTIVE OBLIGATION. AS REGARDS POLISH REP'S REMARKS
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ON LIMITATIONS ON US AND THE USSR, THESE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO A NATIONAL CEILING OR IN FACT TO ANY CEILING AT ALL ON THEIR OVERALL FORCES AND THIS WAS PART OF THE PROBLEM. THEIR ONLY OBLIGATION AS THE MAJOR POWERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE NOT TO REINTRODUCE FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

33. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT, DURING THE ENTIRE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT OF WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE UNWILLING TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS UNTIL AFTER THE EAST HAD AGREED TO THE COMMON CEILING. BUT THE ENTIRE DISCUSSIONS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION DEMONSTRATED THAT, EVEN AFTER THE COMMON CEILING HAD BEEN

AGREED ON, REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS. THUS, EASTERN REPS WOULD NOT KNOW WHAT OBLIGATIONS THESE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE OR EVEN WHAT OBLIGATIONS THEY HAD UNDERTAKEN OR WHETHER THEY HAD CARRIED ANY OBLIGATION OUT. FOR THEIR PART, EASTERN REPS COULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE UNTIL THERE WAS CLARITY ABOUT WESTERN OBLIGATIONS. AFTER ALL, THE EASTERN POSITION WAS THAT ALL SHOULD REDUCE TOGETHER. THE WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN DIFFERENT. IT WAS THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENT UNTIL AFTER THE COMMON CEILING HAD BEEN AGREED TO. AFTER THAT, THEY WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS. BUT NOW IT SEEMED THAT THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATION EVEN THEN, SO THAT EASTERN COUNTRIES WOULD NOT KNOW AT ANY POINT WHAT THESE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED TO DO.

34. US REP SAID THIS WAS GOING TOO FAR. AFTER ALL, FRG AND OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE UNDERTAKING A LIMITATION EVEN IF AN INDIRECT ONE ON THE TOTAL SIZE OF THEIR FORCES. THEY COULD NOT INCREASE THESE FORCES UNLESS OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REDUCED THEIRS. FRG REP SAID THAT THE INTEGRATED NATURE OF THE NATO DEFENSE ALLIANCE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN COLLECTIVE ONES. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS CONTENTION HAD NOT

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BEEN PROVEN. EVEN IF THE WEST HAD AN INTEGRATED ALLIANCE, IT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT INDIVIDUAL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS. EAST WAS ENTITLED TO KNOW WHAT THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE. WHAT WOULD BE WRITTEN INTO THE AGREEMENT? ELEVEN SOVEREIGN COUNTRIES WERE IN VIENNA DISCUSSING MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS. ONE COULD NOT HAVE AN AGREEMENT WHERE SOME PARTICIPANTS UNDERTOOK SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS AND THE OTHERS DID NOT. WESTERN REPS WERE NOT READY TO SAY THUS FAR WHAT OBLIGATIONS THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE. EAST WANTED TO KNOW THESE OBLIGATIONS AND THEY WOULD WANT TO KNOW WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN FULFILLED.

35. FRG REP SAID REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A

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COMMITMENT TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING, BUT EAST HAD NO RIGHT TO IMPOSE NATIONAL CEILINGS AND INTERFERE IN THE WORKINGS OF THE NATO INTEGRATED DEFENSE ALLIANCE.

SMIRNOVSKY SAID THE WEST HAD NO RIGHT TO SEEK TO APPLY A CEILING TO THE SOVIETS. FRG REP SAID THAT THE US WOULD UNDERTAKE THE SAME OBLIGATION. THIS WAS JUSTIFIED FOR THE US AND USSR AS TWO WORLD POWERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

36. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR. PARTICIPANTS HAD NOW HEARD A CLEAR EXPLANATION BY FRG REP THAT THE FRG EVEN IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WESTERN APPROACH DID NOT HAVE IT IN MIND TO ASSUME ANY SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS AS TO ITS REDUCTIONS. THIS DISCUSSION DEMONSTRATED THAT THE FRG CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN AN UNREALISTIC POSITION. FRG REP SAID THAT THE EASTERN INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE "SPECIFIC OB-

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LIGATIONS" WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE WESTERN ONE. IF KHLESTOV MEANT THAT THE FRG AND OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT NATIONAL CEILINGS, THEN HE WAS RIGHT.

37. KHLESTOV SAID PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT NATIONAL CEILINGS IN THE PRESENT DISCUSSION. INSTEAD, THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT THE SPECIFIC OBLIGATION OF EACH PARTICIPANT WITH REGARD TO REDUCTION OF ITS OWN FORCES. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR THAT THE POSITION OF THE FRG WAS THAT, EVEN IN THE PHASE II AGREEMENT CONTEMPLATED BY THE WEST, THE FRG WOULD NOT ASSUME ANY SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS COVERING THE REDUCTION OF ITS OWN FORCES. FRG REP SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN SPEAKING OF THE FRG ALONE BUT OF THE POSITION OF THE REMAINING NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. FRG REP ASKED, WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS THE EAST WAS PROPOSING AND NATIONAL CEILINGS?

38. KHLESTOV SAID FRG REP HAD SPOKEN OF THE NATO POSITION IN THIS REGARD. BUT THE QUESTION HAD BEEN PUT TO HIM SPECIFICALLY AS FRG REP BY POLISH REP AND AMBASSADOR BEHREND HAD REPLIED AS THE FRG REP. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS WOULD CONTINUE TO BASE THEMSELVES ON AMBASSADOR BEHREND'S STATEMENT AS FRG REP AND FROM IT THEY WOULD DRAW THEIR CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE FRG POSITION ON REDUCTIONS. FROM FRG REP'S STATEMENT IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE FRG WAS NOT GOING TO ASSUME ANY SPECIFIC OBLIGATION WITH RESPECT TO REDUCTION OF FRG FORCES IN PHASE II.

39. FRG REP SAID HE HAD MERELY MADE THE POINT THAT NONE OF THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ACCEPT A NATIONAL CEILING. SOVIET REP HAD NOT ANSWERED HIS QUESTION. WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL REDUCTIONS EAST REQUIRED AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL CEILINGS? KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD NOT YET GIVEN AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION BECAUSE HE HAD WISHED TO CLEARLY SUMMARIZE WHAT FRG REP HAD SAID IN HIS EARLIER REMARKS. THE SUBJECT WAS WHETHER THE FRG WAS PREPARED TO ASSUME SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE ITS FORCES. FROM THE RESPONSE GIVEN

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BY THE FRG REP, EASTERN REPS CONCLUDED THAT THE FRG WAS NOT GOING TO ASSUME ANY SUCH OBLIGATIONS. IF THIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE FRG REP'S ANSWER WAS CORRECT, THEN EASTERN REPS WOULD PROCEED FROM IT IN FUTURE DISCUSSION AS WELL AS IN THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE WESTERN SECOND PHASE PROPOSAL. IF THE EASTERN ANALYSIS WAS NOT CORRECT AND

FRG REP STATED THAT FRG WAS PREPARED TO ASSUME SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS ON ITS REDUCTIONS, THEN THIS WOULD BE DIFFERENT.

40. CANADIAN REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A REMARK. KHLESTOV SAID HE WANTED A DIRECT ANSWER FROM FRG REP. CANADIAN REP SAID ALL THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE IN AGREEMENT ON POSITION ADVANCED BY FRG REP. BUT HE WISHED TO ASK KHLESTOV A QUESTION: IF EACH OF THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INDICATED IN A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT THE REDUCTIONS IT WAS PREPARED TO TAKE, WOULD THE EAST BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT COLLECTIVE CEILINGS FOR EACH SIDE? THIS WAS A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION.

41. US DEPREP COMMENTED THAT KHLESTOV EARLIER STATED THAT THERE WAS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE AND THE COMMON CEILING. CONSEQUENTLY, SOVIET REP MUST HAVE IN MIND THAT FROM HIS VIEWPOINT, TWO DIFFERENT KINDS OF OBLIGATIONS COULD BE CONTEMPLATED: FIRST, AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE, AND SECOND, AN OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN A GIVEN CEILING. SINCE SOVIET REP APPEARED TO INDICATE THAT THESE TWO OBLIGATIONS WERE OF SEPARATE NATURE, HE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO REPLY AFFIRMATIVELY TO CANADIAN REP⁶ 173 589.,

42. KHLESTOV SAID THAT HE CONCLUDED FROM CANADIAN REP'S STATEMENT THAT CANADA TOO SHARED THE VIEW OF FRG REP. THIS MEANT THAT CANADA TOO WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN PHASE II IN THE COURSE OF DEVELOPING A PHASE II AGREEMENT. SO THIS VIEWPOINT WAS NOW CLEAR TO EASTERN REPS. HE, IN TURN, WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WAS A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN THE DISCUSSION: EARLIER WESTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT, AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT, THE QUESTION OF WHAT SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE ASSUMED BY EACH REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD BE ADDRESSED IN PHASE II. THE CLARIFICATIONS GIVEN BY CANADIAN REP AND THE QUESTIONS HE HAD JUST ASKED

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FROM US REP MBFR

JUSTIFIED THE CONCLUSION BY EASTERN REPS THAT THE WEST
WAS PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS THAT, IN THE SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT PROPOSED BY THE WEST, CANADA AND THE FRG WOULD NOT ASSUME
SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS TO REEUCE THE FORCES OF THE FRG AND
CANADA. SINCE CANADIAN REP HAD STATED THAT THE OTHER NON-US
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHARED THIS VIEW, THIS MEANT THAT
NONE OF THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE
PREPARED TO ASSUME SPECIFIC
OBLIGATIONS. AS TO THE FRG AND CANADA, THIS WAS
ABSOLUTELY CLEAR SINCE THEIR REPS HAD MADE THIS POINT
DIRECTLY.

43. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THESE REMARKS DID, OF COURSE,
REPRESENT A STEP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THEY WERE
A STEP AWAY FROM A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. SO FAR,
PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN TRYING TO FIND STEPS TO BRING
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THE POSITION OF EACH SIDE CLOSER, STEPS WHICH WOULD
TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POSITION OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS.
NOW, AFTER THE CLARIFICATION PRESENTED ON THIS OCCASION,
IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE WESTERN POSITION WAS STILL
FURTHER AWAY THAN IT HAD EARLIER APPEARED TO BE FROM
WHAT EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED FAIR AND JUST. HIS COLLEAGUES
STRULAK AND SMIRNOVSKY HAD JUST PRESENTED THE EASTERN

VIEW OF INSISTING THAT THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSUME SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD CONCLUDED FROM EARLIER WESTERN STATEMENTS THAT THE WEST WAS GOING TO DEAL WITH THIS QUESTION IN WORKING OUT A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT. BUT NOW, WESTERN REPS HAD MADE IT UNAMBIGUOUSLY CLEAR FROM THEIR STATEMENTS AND QUESTIONS THAT THE FRG AND CANADA WERE NOT GOING TO ACCEPT ANY SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE CLEAR TO ALL PARTICIPANTS THAT THE TERM "SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS" MEANT THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT.

44. KHLESTOV SAID HE WAS OBLIGED TO TELL WESTERN REPS THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT CAUSED A FEELING OF REGRET ON HIS PART.

45. KHLESTOV SAID WESTERN REPS HAD ASKED THE QUESTION AS TO WHAT WAS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL CEILINGS. HE WAS PREPARED TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION, BUT WOULD PREFER FIRST TO HAVE A REACTION OF THE WESTERN REPS TO HIS EARLIER REMARKS.

46. FRG REP SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CORRECT TO SAY THAT THE WESTERN REPS HAD INTRODUCED A NEW ELEMENT INTO THE WESTERN POSITION. THEY HAD MERELY REPEATED THEIR POSITION REGARDING THE ISSUE OF OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT. AS EASTERN REPS WERE AWARE, THE WEST HAD DEVELOPED THIS POSITION IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CONCERNS EASTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSED. ORIGINALLY, IN THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, THE ONLY OBLIGATION

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CONTEMPLATED BY THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT WAS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN AGREEMENT TO REACH A COMMON CEILING. LATER, IN ORDER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF EASTERN CONCERNS, WESTERN REPS HAD TOLD THE EAST THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE II. TO SUM UP, ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, WESTERN REPS HAD REPEATED THEIR WELL-KNOWN POSITION, AS IT HAD DEVELOPED DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, REGARDING WHAT OBLIGATIONS THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT. SECOND, HE HAD REPEATED THE WELL-KNOWN WESTERN POSITION THAT THE

NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT WILLING TO
ACCEPT ANY LIMITATIONS EXCEPT A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING.
KHLESTOV'S CONCLUSIONS FROM THESE REMARKS WERE HIS OWN.
FRG REP'S CONCLUSIONS WERE THAT THE SOVIETS EMPHASIZED
NATIONAL CEILINGS ON FORCES FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT.
IF THIS CONCLUSION WAS NOT JUSTIFIED, HE WOULD LIKE TO
BE CORRECTED.

47. KHLESTOV SAID FRG REP HAD TOLD EASTERN REPS THAT
THE WESTERN POSITION WAS THAT THE NON-US WESTERN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II
REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING. EASTERN REPS HAD OFTEN
HEARD THIS POINT. THEREFORE, THEY HAD FREQUENTLY
INQUIRED PREVIOUSLY AND AGAIN IN TODAY'S SESSION AS TO WHAT
WOULD BE THE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY EACH INDIVIDUAL
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT. SPEAKING FRANKLY, HE HAD
BEEN SURPRISED TO HAVE TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION FROM THE
REMARKS OF FRG AND CANADIAN REPS THAT THEY WERE NOT
PREPARED TO ACCEPT SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN A PHASE II
AGREEMENT. THIS POSITION OF THE FRG AND CANADIAN REPS
REPRESENTED A STEP BACKWARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR
A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. IF EASTERN
REPS COMPARED THIS NEW POINT WITH THE ASSESSMENT
THE EAST HAD EARLIER GIVEN OF THE WESTERN POSITION, THIS
PRESENT POSITION DIVERGED FROM WHAT WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THEY
WERE WILLING TO DO IN CONNECTION WITH THE WESTERN SECOND PHASE
PROPOSAL.

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48. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, TO TURN NOW TO THE QUESTIONS ASKED
BY WESTERN REPS, EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED WESTERN REPS HOW
WESTERN REPS THEMSELVES VISUALIZED OBLIGATIONS TO BE UNDER-
TAKEN BY INDIVIDUAL WESTERN

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FROM US REP MBFR

DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNDER THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL. UNDER THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL, WESTERN REPS SPOKE OF A GENERAL WESTERN COMMITMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE II TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT. THEY HAD THEN SPOKEN OF THE WILLINGNESS OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO ASSUME SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN PHASE II.

49. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EASTERN EFFORT ON THE PRESENT OCCASION WAS TO CLARIFY FOR THEMSELVES THE WEST'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE WEST'S OWN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS WHICH PROVIDED FOR AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING IN THE FIRST PHASE. EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED, IN THAT EVENT, WHAT WOULD BE THE CONTENT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR PHASE II WITH RESPECT TO

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SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS BY THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN CLEAR. EASTERN REPS STILL WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD BE THE SPECIFIC NUMBER OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED BY THE FRG AND UK AND OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE II AND HOW MANY WOULD BE REDUCED BY THOSE EASTERN COUNTRIES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE QUESTION OF THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH COUNTRY WAS NOT DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE QUESTION OF CEILINGS. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THE

TERM "A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT" MEANT AN INDICATION OF THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS, OF WHO AND HOW MUCH EACH WOULD REDUCE, 10,000, 20,000 OR 30,000 MEN. IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE CLARITY ON THIS QUESTION. THE QUESTION OF CEILINGS TO BE ESTABLISHED FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS AND A SEPARATE ISSUE. THE WEST HAD ENVISAGED IN ITS OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING. THE EASTERN APPROACH ENVISAGED NATIONAL CEILINGS, BUT TO INDICATE SPECIFIC NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS THAT A COUNTRY WOULD TAKE WAS NOT THE SAME THING AS INDICATING CEILINGS WHETHER NATIONAL OR OTHERWISE. UNDER THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, IF A COMMON CEILING WERE TO BE ESTABLISHED, IT REMAINED NECESSARY TO INDICATE WHO WAS PREPARED TO REDUCE AND BY HOW MUCH. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO HIM THAT ANY REDUCTION PLAN, WHETHER EAST OR WEST, SHOULD INDICATE CLEARLY WHO WAS WILLING TO REDUCE HIS FORCES AND BY HOW MUCH. ONLY AFTER THIS CAME THE SECOND ASPECT OF THE QUESTION: WHETHER THE RESULT WOULD BE A COMMON OR NATIONAL CEILING. THE EAST FAVERED NATIONAL CEILINGS, WEST FAVERED COLLECTIVE CEILINGS. BUT THIS WAS A SECOND AND SEPARATE ASPECT TO WHICH THERE WERE DIFFERENT APPROACHES. THIS WAS THE ANSWER HE WISHED TO GIVE TO WESTERN QUESTIONS ON THIS TOPIC.

50. CANADIAN REP ASKED WHETHER THIS REPRESENTED KHLESTOV'S ANSWER TO HIS EARLIER QUESTION. KHLESTOV SAID IT WAS. CANADIAN REP SAID HIS EARLIER QUESTION HAD BEEN THAT IF EACH OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS READY TO INDICATE AN INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION OBLIGATION, WOULD THE EAST ACCEPT A COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR EACH

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SIDE? KHLESTOV'S ONLY ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION THUS FAR WAS THAT EACH SIDE HAD DIFFERENT VIEWS. KHLESTOV SAID THE CANADIAN REP'S QUESTION HAD TWO ASPECTS. THE FIRST WAS WESTERN READINESS TO TAKE SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS. FROM REMARKS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, HE FELT THAT THE WEST HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION. EARLIER, ON THE BASIS OF WESTERN REPS' OWN EXPLANATIONS, THE EASTERN UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT WEST WOULD UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN PHASE II.

51. CANADIAN REP SAID IT WAS WRONG ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET REP TO OVER-REACT. THE WEST HAD NOT CHANGED ITS POSITION IN THIS MATTER.

52. GDR REP SAID, IF THAT WERE SO, WHAT WAS THE MEANING OF THE FREQUENTLY MADE WESTERN DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE GENERAL

COMMITMENT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
WERE WILLING TO ASSUME IN PHASE I AND SPECIFIC
COMMITMENTS IN A SECOND PHASE? WHAT WAS THIS DISTINCTION?
WHAT WAS THIS DIFFERENCE? IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT THE
OBLIGATION THAT WESTERN REPS APPEAR TO CONTEMPLATE FOR
THE SECOND PHASE WAS JUST AS VAGUE AND GENERAL AS THAT
CONTEMPLATED FOR THE FIRST PHASE RATHER THAN A MORE SPECIFIC ONE.
FRG REP SAID HE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE SOVIET REP'S STATEMENT
THAT THE QUESTION OF THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS WAS NOT DIRECTLY
LINKED WITH A QUESTION OF CEILINGS. BUT LATTER HAD THEN
RELINKED THE TWO ISSUES IN HIS COMMENTS. THE ISSUE
WAS HOW TO DELINK THE TWO ISSUES AND TO INSURE NOT
ONLY THAT THERE WAS NO DIRECT BUT NO INDIRECT LINK
BETWEEN THE TWO.

53. GDR REP SAID THE TOPIC OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS
THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE
11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. WESTERN REPS HAD STATED
THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD
REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN PHASE II. ON THIS BASIS IT
HAD BEEN WHOLLY LEGITIMATE FOR EASTERN REPS TO ASK
WEST WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND FOR PHASE II. THEREFORE,
EASTERN REPS HAD JUSTIFIABLY EXPECTED TO HEAR THAT,
IN ANY CASE, SPECIFIC AMOUNTS OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SPECIFIED
IN THE SECOND PHASE EVEN IF WEST DID NOT

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WISH TO SPECIFY THIS NUMBER NOW. BUT WAS IT NOT
POSSIBLE THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FRG WOULD STATE DURING
PHASE II THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS
BUT IN FACT REDUCE ONLY ONE SOLDIER? AND EVEN THEN, THE

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1017
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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FRG WOULD CLAIM THAT IT COULD INCREASE ITS FORCES.
GDR REP SAID THAT AN OUTCOME LIKE THIS WOULD BE UN-
ACCEPTABLE TO EASTERN OPINION.

54. POLISH REP SAID THAT, FOR PURPOSES OF DISCUSSION, ONE
SHOULD LEAVE ASIDE THE QUESTION OF CEILINGS. IF THIS
WERE DONE, WOULD WESTERN REPS THEN BE WILLING TO SPECIFY
THE NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH COUNTRY?
FRG REP SAID THIS WAS LIKE ASKING SOMEONE WHETHER THEY WERE
WILLING TO MARRY WITHOUT NAMING THE GIRL.

55. POLISH REP SAID THIS RESPONSE MEANT THAT THE EAST SHOULD
NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT WHO REDUCES BY HOW MUCH AND THAT
THIS WAS THE WEST'S BUSINESS. FRG REP SAID ONE COULD NOT
CONSIDER THIS ISSUE IN ISOLATION FROM THE QUESTION OF
CEILINGS. KHLESTOV SAID IT WAS EVIDENT THAT, EVEN IN
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THE CASE OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING, THE WEST
WAS NOT WILLING TO INCLUDE A SPECIFIC OBLIGATION TO
REDUCE IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT. THERE WOULD BE NOTHING IN
THIS AGREEMENT ON HOW MANY FORCES THE FRG AND CANADA WOULD
REDUCE. IN FACT, THERE WOULD MERELY BE A REPETITION OF THE
WESTERN FIRST PHASE COMMITMENT OF NON-US WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES TO A COMMON CEILING.

56. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, LOGICALLY IN TERMS OF THE WEST'S
OWN REDUCTION APPROACH, WESTERN REPS SHOULD BE WILLING
TO STATE THAT IN PHASE II THE FRG WOULD TAKE 10,000 OR
20,000 REDUCTIONS AND CANADA 1,000 OR 2,000 REDUCTIONS,
SOME SPECIFIC NUMBER, BUT APPARENTLY IN PHASE II, THE REMAINING

WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WANTED ONLY TO UNDERTAKE THE SAME KIND OF VAGUE COMMITMENT THEY PROPOSED FOR PHASE I. FRG REP SAID THAT THE EAST ENVISAGED REDUCTIONS RELATING TO NATIONAL CEILINGS. HOW DID SOVIET REP ENVISAGE SEPARATING THESE TWO THINGS AS HE CLAIMED COULD BE DONE?

57. GDR REP SAID IT WAS REVEALING TO BE ABLE TO SEE WHAT WAS BEHIND THIS WHOLE ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS. FRG REP SAID THE MAIN EASTERN EFFORT WAS TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL CEILINGS.

58. POLISH REP SAID THAT, ACCORDING TO WESTERN FIGURES, THE WEST WAS PREPARED TO REDUCE A TOTAL OF 48,000 MEN IN THE SECOND PHASE. BUT APPARENTLY, ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT WESTERN VERSION, A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD MERELY SAY THE SAME THING AS A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT ABOUT REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS.

59. US DEPREP ASKED POLISH REP WHETHER HE ENVISAGED TWO SEPARATE PROVISIONS OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, PROVISIONS ESTABLISHING REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS AND SEPARATE PROVISIONS ESTABLISHING CEILING OBLIGATIONS?

60. POLISH REP SAID HE WAS NOT THINKING IN SUCH PRECISE TERMS. BUT WHAT WOULD BE THE SO-CALLED SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT? HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD BE THE NATURE OF THESE OBLIGATIONS. FRG REP SAID WESTERN REPS

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CONCLUDED FROM EASTERN PROPOSALS THAT EASTERN OBJECTIVE WAS NATIONAL CEILINGS.

61. POLISH REP SAID THE EASTERN INTEREST ON THE PRESENT OCCASION WAS NOT TO TALK ABOUT EASTERN DESIRES OR THE EASTERN APPROACH. EAST WANTED TO KNOW HOW THE WESTERN REPS INTERPRETED THE WESTERN APPROACH. EASTERN REPS WANTED TO KNOW, SINCE WESTERN REPS SAID THEY WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN PHASE II, JUST WHAT KIND OF OBLIGATIONS THESE WOULD BE. WOULD THIS AMOUNT MERELY TO A JOINT QUTA OR WOULD IT NOT?

62. CANADIAN REP SAID THIS REMARK BROUGHT HIM BACK TO HIS ORIGINAL QUESTION: IF THE WEST WAS WILLING TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS, WOULD THE EAST ACCEPT A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING?

63. SOVIET REP SAID THE CANADIAN REP WAS WELL AWARE THAT THE EAST FAVORED NATIONAL CEILINGS, BUT HIS WAS NOT THE ISSUE. AT PRESENT, EASTERN REPS WERE ASKING WESTERN REPS HOW THE

WEST'S OWN APPROACH WOULD LOOK. WESTERN REPS HAD SAID PRESENT REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO ASSUME CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE. CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS MEANT HOW MANY WOULD REDUCE. THE PURPOSE OF THE EASTERN QUESTION WAS TO LEARN HOW WESTERN REPS WAS ASKING WHETHER THE EAST WOULD ACCEPT THE A COLLECTIVE CEILING IF THE WEST ACCEPTED SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD NOT ASKED THIS QUESTION. EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED WHAT THE EARLIER WESTERN REMARKS MEANT THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ACCEPT SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS ONLY IN PHASE II. WERE THESE NEW CONDITIONS THE WESTERN REPS WERE NOW ADVANCING? WESTERN REPS HAD PROBLEMS WITH NATIONAL CEILINGS. THEORETICALLY, IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT EITHER NATIONAL CEILINGS OR COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WOULD REFLECT THE CONSEQUENCES OF REDUCTIONS. IN THEORY, BOTH WAYS WERE POSSIBLE. WHY DID WESTERN REPS INSIST ON LINKING TWO SEPARATE ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE, REDUCTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES WHEN THE LATTER WAS A SEPARATE SUBJECT? IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE WEST'S OWN POSITION TO SAY THAT THE REMAINING DIRECT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE BY A SPECIFIC SECRET

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P 051000Z JUN 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1018
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
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AMOUNT BUT THAT THE RESULTANT CEILING SHOULD BE
EXPRESSED AS A COMMON CEILING. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
WHOLLY LEGITIMATE TO SAY SOMETHING LIKE THIS ACCORDING
TO THE WEST'S OWN PLAN.

64. CANADIAN REP SAID SOVIET REP HAD BROKEN NEW GROUND
IN ASKING FOR AN INTERPRETATION ON SPECIFIC PHASE II
OBLIGATIONS. THEREFORE, WESTERN REPS HAD BEEN JUSTIFIED
IN ASKING THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER EASTERN REPS WERE
PREPARED TO ACCEPT A COLLECTIVE CEILING. WESTERN REPS COULD
HAVE RESPONDED THAT THEY WERE NOT WILLING TO DISCUSS THIS
ENTIRE ISSUE THAT EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED UNTIL PHASE II.

65. GDR REP SAID IT EMERGED FROM ALL THESE WESTERN STATE-
MENTS THAT THE WESTERN FORMULA ABOUT THE WILLINGNESS OF
THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE
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CONCRETE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS AFTER PHASE I WAS CONCLUDED
WAS MEANINGLESS. THE FURTHER WESTERN OBLIGATION TO
PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING
ALSO TURNED OUT TO MEAN NOTHING, PERHAPS THE REDUCTION
OF ONLY ONE FEDERAL GERMAN SOLDIER. FRG REP SAID IT COULD
MEAN 48,000 NATO SOLDIERS. THIS WAS MORE SPECIFIC
THAN THE EASTERN FIGURES.
FRG REP NOTED THAT SOVIET REP HAD JUST SAID IT WOULD
BE POSSIBLE TO SPECIFY NATIONAL REDUCTIONS WITHOUT ES-
TABLISHING NATIONAL CEILINGS.

66. KHLESTOV SAID HIS POINT HAD BEEN THAT REDUCTIONS
AND CEILINGS WERE NOT DIRECTLY AUTOMATICALLY LINKED.
WESTERN REPS HAD IN THE PAST SAID IT WAS USEFUL TO
HAVE FREE DISCUSSION IN THESE SESSIONS. THERE HAD BEEN ONE ON THE
PRESENT OCCASION. BUT IF FRG REP'S EXPLANATION WAS THE
REAL ONE, IF THE FRG AND CANADA WERE NOT READY TO
ESTABLISH CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS EVEN IN THE SECOND
PHASE, THIS WAS A VERY BAD DEVELOPMENT. FOR EASTERN
REPS AND FOR THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO HEAR THAT, IN THE

SECOND PHASE, THE FRG AND CANADA WERE NOT WILLING TO
UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD BE CONSIDERED
BY ALL A MOVE AWAY FROM AGREEMENT. THE EASTERN POSITION
WAS THAT ALL SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. EARLIER
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THE EASTERN REP HAD BEEN TOLD BY
THE WESTERN REPS THAT ALL WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD
UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN THE LAST STAGE. NOW
EASTERN REPS WERE TOLD THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE SO. FRG REP
SAID THIS CONCLUSION WAS MERELY KHLESTOV'S INTERPRETATION OF
THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR, NOT NECESSARILY THE FACT.

67. EKHLESTOV SAID THE ONLY CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS WHICH COULD
BE CONTEMPLATED IN THIS CONTEXT WAS ON THE SIZE AND TIMING OF
REDUCTIONS. CEILINGS WERE A SEPARATE ASPECT. HE HAD
ASKED WESTERN REPS TO GIVE THE EAST DETAILS OF THEIR
OWN WESTERN PLAN. THEY HAD BEEN THE ONES WHO HAD SAID THAT
MORE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE TAKEN LATER. WHAT
DID THIS MEAN, SPECIFIC? IT WAS A FACT THAT THE WESTERN
REPS HAD MADE THIS STATEMENT TO EASTERN REPS. WESTERN
ANSWERS ON THIS OCCASION JUSTIFIED THE QUESTION, WHAT
WAS THE DIFFERENCE PROPOSED BETWEEN FIRST PHASE AND SECOND

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PHASE OBLIGATIONS BY THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS? WESTERN ANSWERS INDICATED THAT THE ONLY
OBLIGATION WESTERN REPS CONTEMPLATE IN PHASE II
WAS THE REPETITION OF A GENERAL COMMITMENT TO MOVE TOWARD A
COMMON CEILING.

68. FRG REP SAID THAT PHASE II OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE MORE
SPECIFIC THAN THAT. IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A TOTAL
WESTERN REDUCTION OF, FOR INSTANCE, 48,000 MEN. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED
FRG REP WHAT WOULD BE FRG SHARE OF THIS 48,000? FRG REP
WAS AVOIDING AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. THE ENTIRE
DISCUSSION DEMONSTRATED THAT THE FRG WAS NOT READY TO
ASSUME SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN PHASE II. FRG REP SAID
THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN USEFUL. IT CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED
THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE CONTENT OF REDUCTION COMMITMENTS AND
THEIR EFFECTS OR CONSEQUENCES, THE POINT HE HAD MADE AT THE
OUTSET.

69. GDR REP SAID THIS CONNECTION WAS NOT PROVEN AND THE
EAST DISPUTED IT.

70. POLISH REP SAID THESE DEVELOPMENTS WERE A DISAPPOINTMENT
TO EASTERN REPS. WESTERN REPS HAD NOW TOLD EASTERN
REPS THAT THEY WOULD NOT RECEIVE SPECIFICS OF WESTERN
REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE.

71. FRG REP SAID WESTERN REPS HAD NOT MADE THIS STATEMENT.

THEY HAD SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO NATIONAL CEILINGS
AS A RESULT OF PHASE II.

72. POLISH REP SAID WESTERN REPS WANTED THE EAST TO
ACCEPT THEIR WHOLE SCHEME WITHOUT SPECIFYING ANY
OBLIGATIONS AT ALL. THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION.

73. THE SESSION CONCLUDED. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD THE
NEXT SESSION ON TUESDAY, JUNE 10. THE EAST WILL BE THE
HOST RESOR

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